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1. Introduction 
This paper addresses two interconnected questions about human rights and the pursuit of global 
justice: Is there a human right to democracy? How does the achievement of human rights, 
including the human right to democracy, contribute to the pursuit of global justice? In section 2, 
the paper answers the first question in the affirmative. It identifies three reasons for favoring 
democracy and explores the significance of those reasons for defending it as a human right. It 
answers important worries that acknowledging a human right to democracy would lead to 
intolerance and lack of respect for peoples’ self-determination, exaggerate the importance of 
democracy for securing other rights, generalize institutional arrangements that only work in 
some contexts, and tie human rights to specific ideas of freedom and equality that do not have 
the same universal appeal and urgency. In section 3, the paper answers the second question. It 
distinguishes between basic and non-basic global justice and argues that democracy is 
significant for both. It claims that the fulfillment of human rights constitutes basic global justice, 
explains how a human right to democracy has significance for the legitimacy of international 
besides domestic institutions, and shows how forms of global democracy and the exploration of 
cosmopolitan and humanist commitments underlying human rights may enable and motivate the 
pursuit of non-basic demands of global justice (such as those concerning socioeconomic 
equality). The key claim in the paper is that the fulfillment of the human right to democratic 
political empowerment is crucial for the pursuit of global justice. 
 
2. The human right to democracy 
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2.1. General case for democracy 
A system of political decision-making is democratic when those subject to it have effective and 
equal opportunities to participate in it and shape its results. There are at least three important 
reasons for favoring democracy over other ways of organizing decision-making structures that 
do not involve this idea of effective political equality. That democracy is preferable on these 
reasons does not mean that no democracy ever fails to honor them. Actual democracies can be 
better or worse at honoring these concerns; the point is that feasible nondemocratic regimes are 
likely to do worse. Here are the three reasons, stated as features of democracy: 
(a) Expressive recognition and respect (Intrinsic significance): Democracy involves an 
expressive recognition of and respect for human beings as agents with the capacity for 
political judgment and self-determination. 
(b) Strong accountability (Instrumental significance 1): Democracy involves strong 
mechanisms of accountability of decision-makers to decision-takers. 
(c) Epistemic enhancement (Instrumental significance 2): Democratic rights, institutions, 
and practices help political agents to identify and justify to themselves and to each other 
what political principles, agendas, and policies are appropriate. 
The first consideration addresses the intrinsic value of a political decision-making procedure, 
and the other two capture its instrumental value: the former concerns how people treat each 
other within the practice of decision-making, and the latter concerns the issue whether decision-
making tracks the interests or good of those subject to it. An underlying principle is, of course, 
that the worth and interests of all subjects deserves equal respect and concern within some range.  
These three kinds of considerations should be familiar, even if I formulate them in my 
own words.1 My concern in this paper will be to show how they link to the theory and practice 
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of human rights. I think that the three reasons are very important, even though in the context of 
human rights the focus had tended to be on (b). Democracy’s strong accountability certainly is 
crucial, as it involves a powerful incentive mechanism for decision-makers to cater for the 
interests of decision-takers (they may be sacked if they don’t). But the other features are 
important as well. The intrinsic dimension in (a) is crucial: an adult person’s self-respect may be 
deeply wounded if they are treated as a second-class citizen, if their public status in their social 
world is that of someone who cannot or should not participate on equal terms with every other 
adult in the shaping of the coercive rules that frame that world. The epistemic dimension in (c) 
is important (inter alia) because we need strong political freedoms to gain understanding of the 
political process via active experience in it, to deliberate with each other about our political 
views so as to make up our minds, reach agreements or narrow disagreement, find fair 
compromises, and develop less crude or biased pictures about what we and others need and are 
entitled to.  Of course, these features interact. For example, political agents with enhanced 
political knowledge will have more of the information they need to hold decision-makers 
accountable; and the opportunity to do the latter will be an incentive to seek political 
information. Agents who recognize each other as able to make political judgments and as 
worthy of political self-determination will treat each other in certain ways, for example by 
pursuing forms of accountability and public debate that involve appropriate levels of civility. 
 
2.2. Developing the case for a human right to democracy 
2.2.1. Is democracy a human right? 
The three reasons for democracy mentioned support the view that a society that is democratic is 
in some respects more just than a society that is not. But not every right of justice is a human 
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right. In general, a right is a legitimate claim that one person can make against others.2 A right is 
justified when the conditions and interests its fulfillment protects or promotes, and more 
generally the reasons it is based on, are sufficiently important to warrant negative or positive 
duties on the part of certain duty-bearers. Is the right to democracy also a moral human right? 
This depends on whether it has the standard features that characterize moral human rights, such 
being universal, having high normative priority or great normative weight, being primarily a 
critical rather than a positive standard, and being often at least in part to be pursued through 
political action and institutions. I believe that a right to democracy has these features. The last 
two features are obviously held by a right to democracy: it is a right to be largely articulated 
institutionally and it can function as a critical standard for appraising different social structures 
even when those structures do not explicitly recognize it and when people do not currently 
endorse it. The real difficulty is to show that there is a right to democracy that has the features of 
universality and high priority. Is democracy a right that holds for everyone in the contemporary 
world? Is its pursuit a matter of global concern? Does it have the great weight that other, less 
controversial human rights such as the civil right to religious freedom or the socioeconomic 
right to subsistence have?3  
 To show that a right to democracy has these features I will proceed dialectically, by 
addressing the four most important recent challenges to the idea that there is a human right to 
democracy (hereafter HRD). All of these challenges precisely deny that the right to democracy 
is both universal and of high priority. Underlying the polemical engagement with these 
challenges there is a positive argument for a HRD. It is in fact quite simple, and can be stated 
succinctly. The main idea is that we should accept a HRD because (at least contemporary) social 
life involves circumstances that make considerations (a)-(c) (stated in section 2.1) practically 
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relevant in a widespread and urgent way. These common circumstances include the tendencies 
to (i) exclude groups of people from political power and other social advantages, (ii) be self-
serving and biased when wielding decision-making power, (iii) disagree on moral matters, and 
(iv) have limited knowledge of the needs and views of others. These tendencies impose standard 
threats: wielders of political power may monopolize control of social regulations, brand some 
persons as second-class citizens, impose agendas and policies that fail to take account of the 
basic needs and the normative views of others, and render many of those subject to the resulting 
social order impotent to evaluate and to change it. The three dimensions of democracy are 
essential to respond to these threats. When they are in place, political power wielders are more 
likely to guarantee basic conditions of respect and concern for all persons. To the extent that 
people are recognized as having irreplaceable political status as equals, they are able to keep 
decision-makers in check, and they have the capability to join the public debate about what is 
the just way to arrange their social lives, it is that much harder to block their achievement of a 
decent life of basic human dignity. Given these threats and the significance of dimensions (a)-
(c) to respond to them, when people can but are not granted democratic political opportunities 
they are seriously wronged: they are denied what they are owed to live a decent or basically 
dignified life. The remainder of this section fleshes out this argument. 
2.2.2. Toleration, peoples’ self-determination, and intervention 
The first challenge says that accepting a HRD would lead to supporting problematic forms of 
international intervention. Since a human right merits global concern and action, pursuing the 
fulfillment of a HRD would license forceful international intervention in countries that are not 
democratic, and this would involve intolerance toward other forms of political organization and 
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the violation of peoples’ self-determination. If we value international toleration and peoples’ 
self-determination, we should be skeptical about a HRD. 
 Each key aspect of this challenge is problematic. Although the ideas of toleration and 
peoples’ self-determination are of course valuable, they do not support the denial of a HRD, and 
the pursuit of the latter does not require the obliteration of the former. Regarding toleration, 
there is the immediate worry that in nondemocratic countries governments do not tolerate a wide 
range of political actions by their members. Why accept an entitlement to toleration for a regime 
that does not tolerate its own people?4 It would not help to focus on the toleration of peoples as 
the fundamental concern. Human rights are primarily held by individual human beings, not by 
peoples, societies, or states. On the other hand, the ideal of toleration is quite vague. To be made 
precise it needs a substantive account of the conditions that must be met for the conduct of other 
agents to be acceptable even if they are different from one’s own.5 I do not deny the importance 
of the value of toleration and that it could be given a reasonable construal. But clearly any 
plausible account of what may be tolerated will be constrained by the recognition of the 
independent and high priority rights that people have, and this surely includes their human rights. 
One of the obvious functions of human rights is precisely to set reasonable limits to claims of 
toleration. So we should be skeptical about limits on an account of the content of human rights 
that draws on toleration; the direction of limitation is the opposite. 
 Consider next the idea of peoples’ self-determination. First, there is the obvious but 
important point that there is no necessary conflict between the fulfillment of a people’s right to 
self-determination and the HRD, as a people can determine itself while being democratically 
ordered. Second, notice also that the problem of taking peoples rather than people as the unit of 
fundamental concern applies here as well, and this undermines the force of the invocation of 
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collective self-determination in the face of violation of a HRD. If in a certain circumstance the 
invocations of the two claims collide, we should consider whether catering for individuals’ 
interest in their independence as a group should be qualified, or at least joined by serious 
attempts to pursue the honoring of their interest in democratic political opportunities. The 
multiple considerations spelled out in this paper in favor of a HRD also tell in favor of such 
combination (which does not automatically ground a permission for foreign intervention—see 
two paragraphs down). If the members of a people are not themselves self-determining, then the 
self-determination of the group has less moral standing: there is less self-determination when the 
members of a group are blocked from shaping its political life than when they are allowed to 
control the group they constitute. This does not entail that there is no morally relevant way in 
which a society can be self-determining if it is not democratic. The point is that an invocation of 
collective self-determination cannot mute the concern with democratic freedom. 
 There is, then, a serious, and internal, problem with bypassing the wills of the members, as 
nondemocratic regimes do, and then proceed to claim that that group’s will (that is, the will of 
the rulers) expresses them. 6  The rulers of the nondemocratic country may object that their 
subjects themselves accept the nondemocratic nature of their government. But this maneuver 
would be problematic on several counts. First, how do we know that the subjects prefer a 
nondemocratic system if they are not allowed to fully participate in the political process? In the 
absence of strong accountability, they may be afraid to express their views fully even if they are 
allowed to speak publicly. Second, without experience in wielding political power, how do they 
themselves manage to form reflective judgments about political justice? Nondemocratic regimes 
are epistemically deficient. Third, if the legitimation of the regime appeals to what the people 
living under it take to be just, then why deprive the people of the kind of regime (i.e. a 
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democracy) whose procedures and outcomes are really powered by what the people think?7 A 
view of collective self-determination that crushes the political self-determination of the 
members of the collective does not take seriously the freedom of human beings. 
 The worry about forceful international intervention is real, however. Such interventions 
often fail to achieve their publicly avowed goals, involve serious violations of other rights, and 
cement relations of arrogant patronage. But these problems do not really show that there is no 
HRD unless we assume that if something is a human right then its violation makes international 
forceful intervention permissible. And this assumption goes against the grain of the legal and 
political practice of human rights and it is in any case morally unwarranted. Justifiable 
intolerance toward human rights violation need not be coupled with international coercion. 
There are other options. 
 As many critics have argued in response to Rawls’s narrow construal of human rights in 
terms of the conditions for coercive intervention, there are many ways in which domestic and 
international action can respond to human rights violations; “human rights serve many 
international roles, some of them unconnected to enforceability.”8 Forceful intervention is just 
one kind of response, which is likely to be warranted only in extreme cases (such as genocide), 
and even then only as a result of a delicate balancing of many considerations. Human rights are 
primarily obligatory goals that should inform various forms of national and international 
political action. They are not primarily triggers of international coercion.  
 This is as it should be, as human rights are best achieved from the ground up. Institutional 
structures that fulfill the HRD are likely to be best generated primarily domestically, as the 
achievement of a people’s members’ own political struggle. This of course does not mean that 
international solidarity is not warranted. 9  At a minimum, features of the international 
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institutional order that foreseeably and avoidably create means and incentives for domestic elites 
to impose non-democratic regimes on their people should be eliminated. 10  The dilemma 
between aggressive international interventionism and international passivity is a spurious one.11 
We can understand how belief in something like it may have arisen as a result of the recent 
history of American military adventurism, which has sometimes been carried out in the name of 
democracy. But we can reject such aggressive adventurism without letting down fellow human 
beings in other countries who are fighting for their rights. Human rights indeed ground global 
concern. In the case of democracy, such concern can be expressed in innumerable ways that stop 
short of intervention. Several forms are already being explored, from protests and mutual 
assistance by pro-democracy social movements in different countries, to attempts at persuasion 
in several forums of international civil society, to economic and political incentives such as 
making membership in advantageous regional organizations conditional upon democratic 
reforms.12 
2.2.3. Instrumental considerations about the protection of other rights 
One of the strongest defenses of the HRD is that we should accept it because democracy helps 
prevent unacceptable outcomes in terms of uncontroversial human rights, such as famines and 
brutally oppressive tyrannies. This instrumental argument relies on aspects (b) and (c) of 
democracy: where there is a functioning democracy, decision-makers tend to avoid engaging in 
serious abuses because they anticipate that if they do so it will be known and discussed, and they 
will be held accountable. Sen famously argues that because of incentive mechanisms such as 
these, there has been no famine in a functioning democracy.13 So, if we want to avoid the 
underfulfillment of civil and socioeconomic human rights, we should accept a HRD. Democracy 
inherits the great weight of the rights it protects. 
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 This instrumental argument for a HRD has recently come under fire from Joshua Cohen.14 
Cohen’s first challenge says that we can imagine a regime that involves collective self-
determination, is not democratic, and protects human rights. Collective self-determination 
involves three conditions: 
1. “[B]inding collective decisions result from, and are accountable to, a political process that 
represents the diverse interests and opinions of those who are subject to the society’s laws and 
regulations and expected to comply with them” 
2. “[R]ights to dissent from, and appeal, those collective decisions are assured for all” 
3. “[G]overnment normally provides public explanations for its decisions, and those explanations—
intended to show why decisions are justified—are founded on a conception of the common good of 
the whole society”.15 
These conditions can be fulfilled even if there is political inequality (for example, if members of 
a certain ethnic group are denied access to decision-making positions in government). As long 
as there are mechanisms of representation of interests, dissent and appeal, and explanations that 
track fundamental interests such as those protected by basic civil and socioeconomic rights, the 
human rights of those partially excluded are not violated. They do not have a human right to be 
treated as political equals. 
 A concern about this view is whether it is realistic to expect that conditions 1-3 will reliably 
be satisfied, and lead to the protection of people’s fundamental interests, without political 
equality. It is not enough to wonder whether it is possible for this to happen. For example, an 
enlightened despot certainly could exist that satisfies these conditions without democratic 
accountability. But it would be irresponsible to determine what political rights to recognize on 
the basis of just this possibility. We must also consider the relative probability that different 
political arrangements will protect fundamental interests. And it seems that the burden of proof 
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is here on the side of those who entertain the avoidance of democracy. Given the overwhelming 
wealth of historical evidence about the tendency to bias and abuse of political power, it is 
imprudent for agents not to favor regimes including mechanisms of strong accountability 
through equal rights to affect the political process of the kind only democracy affords.16 As 
historical experience concerning manual workers and women suggests, those who lack equal 
and effective rights to affect the political process are more likely to be ignored by decision-
makers. Their interests are less likely to be duly represented, and they are less likely to be 
consulted or offered explanations. And to be consulted, allowed to dissent and appeal, and given 
explanations is not enough. People also have reason to be able to sack decision-makers who do 
not in fact cater to the fundamental interests they pledge to track. Thus instrumental 
considerations regarding the fulfillment of civil and socioeconomic rights in principle tell in 
favor of accepting strong political rights.  
 Cohen has a second challenge. He worries that “it is not clear how strong a case we have for 
the claim that a society that ensured a relatively rich set of human rights, including conditions of 
collective self-determination short of democracy, would nevertheless be so clearly unacceptable 
as to bear so much argumentative weight in the case for a human right to democracy”.17 The 
instrumental argument for democracy discussed here assumes that it is the lack of specifically 
democratic rights that is crucial when explaining the occurrence of famine, tyranny, etc. But, 
Cohen notes, when these terrible outcomes ensue we often find other factors that might be 
explanatorily relevant, such as weak or absent rule of law, freedom of the press, and collective 
self-determination.  
 Does this challenge succeed at overturning the received wisdom that in the absence of 
democracy the fundamental interests of all are less likely to be reliably protected? We cannot 
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answer this question without looking at the empirical evidence. In a recent paper, Christiano has 
argued that in fact the empirical evidence available supports the instrumental case for 
democracy. The empirical debate is set to continue.18 I would like to I add, however, that we 
should not put endorsement of a HRD aside until the empirical dispute is settled. First, the 
instrumental argument should not be construed in unduly strong terms. From a practical 
standpoint, to support democracy instrumentally we do not need to find that famines and other 
terrible outcomes can only occur when and only because democracy is absent. It is enough if the 
evidence shows that democracy is an important (even if not the only) relevant contributory 
factor so that in its absence the likelihood of such conditions increases significantly. Second, in 
the face of uncertainty about the precise composition of the explanatory factors leading to severe 
underfulfillment of human rights, and given that so far research appears to show that democracy 
is an important factor,19 it is only prudent to be risk averse and err on the side of keeping the list 
of rights ample (including democracy besides the rule of law, freedom of the press, and the other 
important factors). It would be a reckless bet to choose a nondemocratic regime before the 
empirical evidence develops enough to actually tip the balance away from the received wisdom 
that those with less political power are less secure in the enjoyment of their rights. 
2.2.4. Institutional specificity and the problem of generalization 
Another challenge to a HRD is that it may lack universal application and high priority because it 
relies on too specific an account of the institutions of collective self-determination needed to 
protect other, uncontroversial human rights (such as basic civil, socioeconomic, and other 
political rights). In some, perhaps most, cases, democratic institutions will likely do best, but in 
some cases they may not. Beitz has recently pressed this charge, arguing that we cannot 
generalize the instrumental argument discussed in 2.2.3 because there may be cases of 
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nondemocratic societies in which either (i) economic conditions are such that the instauration of 
democracy may not lead to a stable regime or might involve lower protection of uncontroversial 
rights than some alternative, feasible regime; or (ii) the political culture is one in which the 
strong political equality that HRD involves is widely rejected, while the less demanding form of 
collective self-determination discussed by Cohen enjoys wide allegiance.20 I think that the most 
serious worry concerns (i). As stated the second puzzle risks a conventionalist view of the 
validity of human rights that is incompatible with seeing them as critical standards. The 
existence of rights does not depend on people believing that they exist. Slavery would involve a 
violation of rights even if most people (including the slaves) did not think there is a right against 
it. Such beliefs are relevant for the feasibility of implementing rights in the short term, but that 
is a different matter. 
 Let us grant, for the sake of argument, that in the short term the instauration of democracy in 
a certain country would likely lead to higher costs in terms of other, uncontroversial rights than 
the instauration of an authoritarian regime that approximates the features of collective self-
determination discussed in 2.2.3. How could a defender of a HRD respond? The first thing to 
say is that the high priority of human rights should not be interpreted too narrowly, as meaning 
that to have it, a demand should be immediately and fully implementable. Human rights set up a 
normative agenda for the political future. What is crucial is that we recognize them as setting 
political goals of great importance, which we can achieve some time in the future and should 
pursue to the extent that we reasonably can from now on. When we encounter circumstances in 
which an obligatory goal cannot be achieved, we should acknowledge dynamic duties to 
progressively change them so that the obligatory goal becomes achievable.21 Cases like the one 
we are here granting for the sake of argument can be seen as part of the nonideal theory of 
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human rights. Such nonideal theory would depend on an ideal theory that sets the optimal 
feasible targets of long-term reform, and it would deal with cases of partial compliance and 
conditions in which the fulfillment of the ideal demands is not immediately feasible. Given that 
democratic regimes are feasible in the long-term, and that (as Beitz recognizes) they are more 
likely than the alternatives to reliably protect the whole set of other urgent rights when stable, 
we should take them as the target for long-term reform. But since in the case under 
consideration we face nonideal circumstances, we should adopt a transitional standpoint that 
explores the process rendering the final target accessible. Such process need not start with an 
immediate push for democratic institutions if the likely outcomes are worse on balance. 
 Second, the long-term view favoring democracy is not idle in the short term. It would have 
immediate bite in at least two ways. First, it would impose high evidentiary standards for 
choosing nondemocratic alternatives in the short term. The presumption would be that 
democracy should be pursued unless compelling evidence is given that an alternative regime 
would be better overall in the short term. Second, it would demand that among the several 
feasible nondemocratic regimes that would do better, in the short term, at catering for other 
rights, we choose the one that is most likely to ease the transition to democracy in the future.22 
Thus, the goal of achieving democracy plays an immediate role in determining whether we 
should favor a nondemocratic regime in the short term, and which one we should favor if we 
must indeed favor some. 
 Third, including democracy in the long-term political agenda of human rights would not 
only be reasonable given its likelihood to do better than the alternatives in the instrumental ways 
discussed so far once a stable form of it is achieved. In addition, democracy has intrinsic 
significance. An account of collective self-determination that is nondemocratic (accepting, for 
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example, unequal rights to vote or hold public office for people of different ethnic, religious, or 
other groups) violates the normative individualism and the commitment to some forms of 
equality and liberty that are constitutive of the human rights perspective. I will explore this point 
in 2.2.5. But if this is correct, a consequence for the present discussion is that even if we 
construe human rights as making immediate demands of full implementation, the problem 
discussed in the hypothetical case would not be whether democracy is a right, but what is its 
relative weight when other rights (such as certain civil and socioeconomic rights that would be 
better served by a nondemocratic regime) conflict with it in practice.23 (It would also not need to 
be an issue whether democracy involves a high right: Democracy could be a member of a 
package of high priority rights even if in some circumstances its implementation has less 
priority than that of other rights in the same package.) The loss in terms of the intrinsic value of 
democracy leaves a reminder when a different regime is chosen that does better in the short term 
with respect to instrumental considerations concerning other rights. We are here facing a tragic 
choice rather a mere tradeoff, and thus that reminder must be acknowledged.  The first and 
second points mentioned above then reapply, this time regarding the future satisfaction of what 
has been left out in terms of the intrinsic concern.24 
 Fourth, and finally, there is the issue of institutional specificity. The problem with the 
hypothetical case discussed here may be less likely to arise if we notice that the HRD can be 
stated at different levels of institutional abstraction. At the level of principle, HRD can be stated 
in a relatively vague way that captures the key idea of political equality. The specific 
institutional form that political equality should take depends on the circumstances of the context 
in hand.25 So if one specific institutional form of democracy (say, a certain electoral system, or 
organization of the relation between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of 
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government) is not likely to be stable in a certain context, this does not entail that democracy as 
such has no immediate stable application. Perhaps another specific articulation of political 
equality will be immediately stable. This argumentative triangulation (responding to the 
immediate unworkability of a certain institutional implementation by moving up one level to the 
relevant animating principle and then envisaging alternative re-specifications of it to see 
whether one is workable) must be pursued before moving to the concessive, nonideal parts of 
the exercise discussed above. When we think about the universality of democracy, we should 
ask whether the key principle has general hold, not whether any of its specific incarnations is 
generalizable.26 
2.2.5. Intrinsic considerations of freedom and equality 
The intrinsic argument for democracy supports democracy because it involves an organization 
of the ultimate political decision-making structures and practices of society such that through 
them human persons express the respect and recognition due to human persons given their 
capacity to form political judgments and determine themselves politically. Beings with these 
capacities (and most human beings have them to a sufficient degree—although of course they 
differ beyond it) are seriously harmed when they are treated as political puppets or inferiors. 
This thought involves ideas of political freedom and equality. Democratic institutions aim at 
giving the adults subject to the political system equal political freedoms, which amount to equal 
and effective opportunities to participate in shaping the political process and its outcomes. A 
political system is procedurally unfair if it gives some of its subjects more rights of participation 
than others: all agents with the capacity of political judgment and self-determination deserve 
equal rights. Of course those capacities can and should be developed. And democracies will be 
in one way better, or deeper, to the extent that they facilitate such development.  
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 The intrinsic argument for a HRD is more controversial than the instrumental one. To see 
this we can address another important recent challenge posed by Cohen. The worry is that in 
invoking ideas of freedom and equality, this defense of a HRD may present an unduly 
maximalist view of human rights in which the distinction between human rights and justice is 
simply erased. But intuitively we think such a distinction exists, that human rights are only a 
proper subset of what justice demands, and that this distinction is important for the role of 
human rights as especially weighty demands of both domestic and global political action. Ideas 
of freedom and equality seem better located at the complement of human rights in the wider set 
of demands of liberal-egalitarian justice, which do not so readily seem to have the kind of global 
priority that human rights are meant to have. A right to democracy is then best seen not as a 
human right, but as a wider (less weighty, not so uncontroversially universal) demand of justice. 
 I discuss the details of Cohen’s challenge elsewhere.27 Here I want to make three positive, 
but related, points. The first is that ideas of freedom and equality are already operative in the 
founding document of the contemporary human rights political practice, the Universal 
Declaration, and that it is natural to see them as helping in making the intrinsic argument for a 
HRD. Cohen takes political democracy to depend on the following two ideas: (a) “each member 
is understood as entitled to be treated with equal respect, and therefore as entitled to the same 
basic rights, regardless of social position”; (b) “the basis of equality lies, in particular, in … 
political capacity: we owe equal respect to those who have sufficient capacity to understand the 
requirements of mutually beneficial and fair cooperation, grasp their rationale, and follow them 
in their conduct”. 28  Now consider the Preamble and Articles 1 and 2 of the Universal 
Declaration. The Preamble opens by referring to the “recognition of the inherent dignity and of 
the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family” as being “the foundation of 
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freedom, justice and peace in the world.” Article 1 says that “[a]ll human beings are born free 
and equal in dignity and rights,” and “are endowed with reason and conscience and should act 
toward one another in a spirit of brotherhood,” and Article 2 claims that “everyone is entitled to 
all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration without distinction of any kind, such as 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status.” These three framing clauses evidently support an idea of equal respect of 
the kind envisaged in (a), according to which all should be seen as equal in rights regardless of 
their social position and background. Article 1’s reference to certain cognitive and volitional 
endowments, if applied to human adults who are not severely mentally impaired (i.e. those in 
whom the endowments are clearly present), also identifies aspects of the idea of political 
capacity targeted by (b). If all such human adults are free and equal in dignity and rights, and 
have reason and conscience, and can (given that they ought to) act toward each other in a spirit 
of brotherhood, then arguably they have enough political capacity to be responsible citizens in a 
democratic polity. These points can clearly be used to support the idea that a HRD has intrinsic 
significance. 
 Could the ideas mentioned be reasonably accepted, in global public reasoning, by people 
who disagree in their comprehensive religious, moral, and philosophical outlooks, and who have 
also disagreements about what justice in the wide sense demands? The second point is that the 
ideas of freedom and equality just mentioned are relatively thin in two ways that are relevant for 
making a case for their universality and high priority. The first way concerns the levels of depth 
of ideas and principles in normative argument. The ideas of freedom and equality mentioned 
could be intermediate premises by reference to which we can justify the view that political 
decision-making should be democratic. But such intermediate premises can in turn be defended 
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by appeal to different, and often incompatible, deeper commitments. A Kantian might say that 
democratic freedom is derived from the more fundamental idea of autonomy as the source of 
value and normative validity. Defenders of some forms of religious morality could say that 
humans are equal in the eyes of God, who designed them with certain powers of autonomous 
political decision-making that is their duty to respect and use. Agreement on the idea of political 
freedom and equality does not require agreement at the level of these deeper comprehensive 
doctrines. The second way in which the ideas of political freedom and equality are relatively 
thin concerns the relation between political and other social institutions. Some may challenge 
the view that people should be equally free to determine decision-making in every domain of 
social action. Some hierarchies may be justifiable in some settings. But this point is not 
incompatible with political freedom and equality. What has high priority is that equal freedom 
be recognized at the level of the main political institutions. Why is it crucial that equal freedom 
exist at that level? Because politics is the master social institution; it sets conditions on every 
other social institution in a society. This is why agents have very strong reason to be equally free 
at the political level. At other levels it is less important, and sometimes not even desirable, to 
live in conditions of equal freedom. 
 A consequence of the previous point is that although the thin ideas of freedom and equality 
support a HRD, they do not obliterate the distinction between human rights and maximalist 
claims of justice. There clearly are more demanding views of freedom and equality as a matter 
of justice. The third point is that in fact equal political freedom helps frame the discussion about 
maximal justice in a fair way. Disagreement about justice is an enduring fact of contemporary 
social life. People disagree on whether, and how, ideas of freedom and equality (and other ideas 
of justice) are to be elaborated in different spheres of society (including, prominently, the 
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economic one). Human rights are not meant to settle such disagreements. They can, however, 
enable their fair treatment. They do this by securing a floor of dignity on which disagreeing 
agents can stand. Such a floor of dignity clearly includes basic civil and socioeconomic rights 
such as bodily integrity and subsistence. But it should also include robust political rights of the 
kind democracy secures. Without them, the elaboration of disputes about wider justice would 
not give all a fair chance to contribute to the debate and to decide what proposals in it should be 
tried out, and later on perhaps repelled or amended, by the coercive decision-making political 
institutions. 
 At this point the intrinsic argument for democracy joins forces with the instrumental 
argument in both its accountability and epistemic dimensions. We should have democratic 
forms of egalitarian politics to recognize and respect, and give full play, to the cognitive and 
volitional capacities of all political agents: democracy enables us to learn from each other, and 
to negotiate our disagreements in fair and informed ways. More specifically, democracy is 
important in the following ways. First, the intrinsic value of democracy is evident once we try to 
explain why of two final outcomes that are equal in every respect in terms of rights protection 
(other than democracy) the one reached through a decision-making process that involves equal 
political liberty is better than the other that does not. Being publicly recognized and empowered 
as an equal in shaping one’s social world is something we have reason to care about. Second, 
equal participation, including public deliberation, is of great importance. It helps identify 
appropriate (desirable and feasible) specifications of abstract rights for the circumstances we 
face. It helps us find appropriate balancing acts if the implementation of several rights must 
conflict in practice. It enables us to reach fair compromises when full agreement is not viable. It 
provides us with a way to learn about the specific circumstances, beliefs and needs of others in 
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diverse multicultural settings in which we cannot simply assume that everyone shares our 
worldview. Finally, democratic institutions and practices help cement a public culture of respect 
and attention to the interests and voice of each that makes social cooperation more stable. That 
public culture helps make cooperation more dynamic and productive as well; democratic power 
does not only help us protect ourselves from threats by others; it also enables us to join with 
others to design and pursue social projects that improve people’s lives in various ways. These 
points have general significance for the pursuit of global justice, the topic to which I now turn. 
 
3. Human rights, democracy, and the pursuit of global justice 
3.1. Basic and non-basic global justice 
How does the recognition of a HRD affect the pursuit of global justice? To answer this question, 
we first need to distinguish between basic and non-basic, including maximal, global justice. 
Basic global justice targets the most urgent global demands concerning the conditions for a 
decent life for all, i.e. the fulfillment of human rights, whereas non-basic global justice includes 
but goes beyond that. Consider economic justice. The universal fulfillment of the human right to 
an adequate standard of living including basic levels of nutrition, education, health care, and 
housing (stated in Article 25 of the Universal Declaration) would be an achievement of basic 
global justice. Beyond that, we can imagine more demanding claims of global justice. Some say 
that we should, as a matter of justice, aim for global equality of access or opportunity regarding 
goods such as advanced education and health care, income, wealth, forms of work involving 
self-realization, etc. These goods go beyond the objects of human rights. If access to them is an 
entitlement of global justice, it must be one of non-basic global justice. How does democracy fit 
this distinction? First, if it is a human right, democracy is a matter of basic global justice. As we 
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saw, some critics disagree; they think that it is not weighty or universal enough to be a human 
right and that it might perhaps, at best, be seen instead as a demand of non-basic global justice. 
The response to such worries presented in section 2 amounts to defending a right to democracy 
as a demand of basic global justice. But we still need to consider what is the significance of 
democracy for the design of international institutions, if any. How does a HRD affect the reform 
and creation of international institutions? A second question is: how does a HRD affect the 
pursuit of non-basic global justice? In what follows I present a brief exploration of these two 
questions. Answering them is important for completing the defense of a HRD. Given limits of 
space, my remarks will be short, but I hope they offer illuminating hypotheses for future 
discussion. 
3.2. The pursuit of basic global justice 
How should we think about international institutions if we aim at the global fulfillment of 
human rights? What is the role of a HRD in this exercise? Consider Article 28 of the Universal 
Declaration, according to which “Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in 
which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.” From the 
discussion in section 2 we can claim that domestic social orders should be democratic. We can 
also claim that a just “international order” would be one that promotes democracy in domestic 
settings. These are not minor results. But should we think of the institutions making up the 
international order as themselves bound by democratic norms? If so, how and why?29 
 Should international institutions such as the World Trade Organization be democratically 
organized? In an illuminating recent article considering this question, Thomas Christiano 
identifies two kinds of answers and important challenges they face. 30  I will reconstruct 
Christiano’s points and then (in the next paragraph) offer a critical assessment of them. One 
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option is a revision of the common “voluntary association model,” which legitimizes  
international institutions and their actions on the basis of the consent to them given by member 
states. This model seems relatively feasible given the importance of states for any stable 
international institution (it would not last without their cooperation) and desirable given that 
states may be quite successful at defending the interests of their subjects. However, this model 
faces two serious problems. The “representativeness problem” arises when some of the 
participating states are not democratic. The “asymmetric bargaining problem” arises when states 
have enormous differences in bargaining power that allow stronger states to dragoon weaker 
ones into accepting conditions of international association that are unfair. For example, 
negotiations in the WTO may yield exploitative conditions for poorer countries. This model 
could be revised into a “fair democratic association” model in which member states are 
democratic and certain institutional restrictions on unfair bargaining are imposed. However, the 
accessibility of this model is problematic given the existing global inequalities in economic and 
political power. Still, Christiano thinks that it is overall better to work toward realizing this 
model than to pursue another, more ambitious model of “global democracy” calling for the 
legitimation of the international global order through a global parliament with representatives of 
constituencies of individuals. This model faces insurmountable problems. The most serious are 
these. First, democracy is a valid ideal for institutions only if those bound by them have roughly 
equal stakes in their decisions. This condition is met by modern states but not by international 
institutions. (For example, some countries are much more involved in international trade than 
others.) Second, there is not enough in the way of an international civil society (in terms of 
political parties, interests groups, and media outlets) to establish a sufficiently meaningful 
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communication between global institutions and individuals across the world. Again, the contrast 
with the domestic case is too deep. 
 I think that Christiano is right that we should pursue some version of the fair democratic 
association model (and that we should do it for the reasons he states). But his rejection of global 
democracy is too quick. First, the condition of equal stakes could be met by a global parliament 
if its remit is properly circumscribed.31 Importantly for our discussion, it could be focused on 
legislating on conditions on any other international institution (such as the WTO) so that its 
activities are consistent with the promotion and protection of human rights.32 Everyone has a 
strong and equal stake in that. And international institutions directly representing individuals 
rather than states are appropriate here because it is the former, not the latter, that have human 
rights.  
 Second, the problem of weak civil society could be progressively resolved over time. The 
current process of globalization is already generating many forms of supranational political 
action, forums, and organizations. This could be accelerated by the creation of a global 
parliament focused on human rights, whose presence and action would create an incentive for 
the creation of new arenas of international civil society. That parliament could at first be only 
deliberative and perform tasks of recommendation, and develop the power to yield binding 
regulation only later on, when international civil society thickens to a sufficient degree. 
Interestingly, this progressive pursuit of a circumscribed global parliament might have positive 
interactions with the pursuit of the conditions for fair bargaining within the inter-state 
association. The former could press for action to remove conditions of extreme vulnerability, 
and thus bolster the negotiation power of the excluded or exploited. 
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 Two key ideas underlying the position I suggested in the previous paragraphs concern (a) the 
natural duties based on the cosmopolitanism of human rights and (b) the dynamic and long-term 
nature of the political practice they ground. Regarding (a): If we owe equal moral concern and 
respect to every human being at least when it comes to the fulfillment of their human rights, 
then the idea of an “international order” invoked in Article 28 of the Universal Declaration 
should be interpreted as demanding not only the reform of existing international institutions, but 
also the creation of new ones (when this can be done at reasonable cost to those affected) that 
will respond to the preexisting equal stake of every person in (either existing or feasible to 
create) institutions protecting human dignity. Such institutions should be democratic in order to 
target that goal—and the three dimensions of democracy discussed in this paper point in that 
direction. 
 Regarding (b): Global institutions focused on human rights, if they include the third, 
epistemic dimension of democracy, will help us navigate more lucidly the uncertainties 
concerning what is the most reasonable way to protect human rights in the world. Given the first 
and the second dimensions, they will also also make such protection lose the aura of unilateral 
imposition that human rights policies sometimes have in contemporary politics. They would 
constitute a form of global egalitarian empowerment through which the members of the global 
community of human beings (and there always is such a community from the moral point of 
view) pursue, in an autonomous way, the fulfillment of the human rights of each. 
3.3. The pursuit of non-basic global justice 
The previous discussion concerns human rights and basic global justice. But the pursuit of basic 
global justice affects the pursuit of non-basic global justice in important ways. 
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 First, the generation of institutions and practices of supranational democracy (of the two 
kinds discussed) provide a political bridge between the pursuit of basic and non-basic justice. A 
world where basic global justice is achieved is one in which people have a floor of dignity to 
stand on. That floor is also a floor of power, as these people are in control of the political shape 
of their social world, both domestic and international.33 That power gives them the capability to 
explore together, on fair terms, the issue whether global justice involves more than human rights, 
and if so what. The three aspects of democratic empowerment are important for this exploration: 
the exploration can be undertaken by those who will be subject to its results, whoever makes 
decisions on the implementation of emerging proposals will be accountable to those subjected to 
them, and everyone will have effective opportunities to improve through political experience 
and public deliberation everyone’s epistemic grasp of the practical alternatives and their likely 
consequences on agents placed in different circumstances.34 
 The global fulfillment of human rights, including a HRD, constitutes a bridge in the 
movement from basic to non-basic global justice. But secondly, although human rights are only 
a proper subset of the demands of global justice, they rely on ideas that can, and arguably should, 
be developed further at the level of non-basic global justice. I conclude by suggesting the 
importance of two such ideas: cosmopolitanism and humanism. First, human rights mark the 
entrance of cosmopolitanism in domestic and international politics.35 This has an important 
consequence for the kinds of duties the pursuit of basic justice should involve. Those duties 
should be not only agent-relative but also agent-neutral: human rights in the cosmopolitan sense 
should be respected and promoted by everyone toward everyone else. Duty-bearers may have 
responsibilities to right-holders whether they are intertwined in certain associative ventures or 
not. There are pro tanto duties to promote human rights with strictly universal scope. This 
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prompts the hypothesis that there are some duties of non-basic global justice that also have a 
cosmopolitan nature. This point is already part of the practice of global movements focused on 
introducing and deepening democracy. 36 
 Second, and relatedly, the pursuit of non-basic global justice may also inherit the humanism 
of human rights (i.e. the view that some claims are based in our shared humanity). Consider 
global economic justice. Some pro tanto demands of global economic equality may be worth 
considering, in which certain conditions for human flourishing that all human beings as such 
have reason to value (such as advanced forms of health care and education) are pursued, 
whether their promotion occurs amongst those who already share associative frameworks or not. 
Once we acknowledge universal socioeconomic humanist rights with a sufficientarian target, 
why not acknowledge some universal egalitarian entitlements? 
 Of course, I am not here attempting to show that these two suggestions about how the 
cosmopolitanism and humanism of human rights might shape the pursuit of non-basic global 
justice are true. The aim is simply to suggest that these are relevant hypotheses to explore. And 
the political conditions for such an exploration, as I have argued above, is precisely one of the 
achievements that the fulfillment of a HRD would deliver for all. The central conclusion is, then, 
that the fulfillment of the human right to democratic political empowerment is crucial for the 
pursuit of global justice.37 
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1 See Beitz (1989); Christiano (2008); Habermas (1996); and Sen (1999). 
2 Waldron (2007, p. 746). 
3 In this paper I assume that the universality of human rights ranges over all persons in the contemporary world. A 
wider scope could be argued for, but I restrict my argument to the weaker account of universality that most critics 
of a human right to democracy accept. I also assume that that the high priority of human rights depends on their 
ranging over the conditions enabling a decent or basically dignified life. The focus is on conditions enabling a 
minimally good life rather than (as arguably wider demands of justice concern themselves with) a flourishing life. 
On the last point see Nickel (2007, p. 62). The idea of human dignity in its basic and maximal forms is explored in 
Gilabert (2015a, 2015b). 
4 I am not claiming that a nondemocratic regime necessarily is intolerant towards its own people in every important 
respect. A nondemocratic regime could, for example, tolerate many of its residents’ exercise of their civil rights 
(such as their freedom of religion). But toleration with respect to civil (and other) rights does not entail that 
intolerance with respect to political participation does not exist. So the nondemocratic regime is still intolerant in an 
important respect. (Furthermore, one should worry about how secure other rights are when residents do not have 
effective power to respond to a regime that changes course and decides to violate them.) A possible difficult 
question is how to respond to practical circumstances in which the two immediately feasible options are (a) a 
democratic regime under which serious underfulfilment of civil and social rights is likely to occur and (b) a 
nondemocratic regime under which significantly greater fulfillment of civil and social rights is likely. I tackle this 
question in section 2.2.4 below. 
5 Forst (2004). 
6 A sentiment of this kind may underlie the struggle of many oppressed groups. Consider, for example, MP Sophia 
Abdi’s reaction after the Kenyan government decided to ban female genital mutilation: “Today is independence day 
for women. Men got their independence in 1963—but today women have achieved independence from the cruel 
hands of society.” Cited in Boseley (2011, p. 13). 
7 I thank Carol Gould for discussion on this point. There is the conceptual possibility that a people democratically 
choose to become nondemocratic. Would this be acceptable or should it be as problematic as the case of voluntary 
slavery? My intuitive answer is that the latter is true, but the issue requires further discussion. 
8 James Nickel (2007, p. 101). For Rawls’s view see Rawls (1999, pp. 78-81). An important function of human 
rights is that they warrant global concern and action, but the latter can take many forms. See Beitz (2009, pp. 31-
42). 
9 Democracy most often comes from the streets, not from foreign warships. The recent Arab Spring (e.g. in 
Tunisia), like the transition to democracy in Latin America and Eastern Europe around the 1980s, are possible 
examples. The achievements of the movements behinds these transitions where supported by various forms of 
international solidarity, but they were not the outcome of international coercive intervention. 
10 These include, for example, the international “resources”, “arms,” and “borrowing” privileges through which 
elites in poor countries can sell natural resources, purchase weapons, and contract debt in their peoples name, which 
enable them to cement their despotic rule. See Pogge (2008). 
11 I share Benhabib’s worry that a “laudable concern for liberal toleration and peaceful coexistence can also lead to 
liberal indifference, and … to an unjustified toleration for the world’s repressive regimes such as many ‘decent, 
hierarchical peoples’ (Rawls) may be and often are.” Benhabib (2011, p. 78). 
12 Rich (2001, pp. 20-34). An important and hopeful recent development in Latin America is the introduction (in 
2010) of the “democratic clause” within the UNASUR (Union de Naciones Suramericanas--Union of South 
American Nations). It authorizes coordinated responses to threats to the democratic institutions of any member state. 
See http://www.unasursg.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=292&Itemid=340 
13 Sen (2009, ch. 16). 
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14 What follows draws, with revisions, on my more detailed discussion on Cohen’s views in Gilabert (2012b, pp. 
10-3, 22-3). 
15 Cohen (2010, pp. 357-8). See also Rawls (1999, sect. 9). 
16  “The fundamental interests of adults who are denied opportunities to participate in governing will not be 
adequately protected and advanced by those who govern. The historical evidence on this point is overwhelming.” 
Dahl (1998, p. 77; see further pp. 77-8 and 52-3). 
17 Cohen (2010, p. 371). 
18 Christiano (2011). Christiano’s conclusions are not undisputed. A worry (discussed in the next section) is that the 
comparison between democratic and nondemocratic regimes in terms of overall human righs fulfillment may be 
less favorable to democratic regimes in very poor societies than in middle- and upper-income ones. 
19 For the strong correlation between democratization and support for international human rights law see Simmons 
(2009, pp. 24-7). Simmons does not claim that democracy causes, but she says that it supports, the legalization of 
international human rights, and she explores some possible mechanisms (such as strong accountability) 
underpinning this contribution. 
20 Beitz (2009, sect. 26). 
21 On the idea of dynamic duties see Gilabert (2009). A worry could be that it is unrealistic to expect that we will 
know enough about what is likely to happen in the future for considerations about the long term to affect our 
current choices. I am not sure this is always the case. But when it is, we may still have dynamic duties to expand 
our level of political knowledge. Second, we must also factor in the undesirability of the status quo. The worse it is, 
the less strict we need to be about our foresight of the future to choose to make moves away from it. Even if the 
status quo is desirable, notice, third, that if we are unable to foresee the future, this may include inability to forsee 
whether the status quo will continue if we don’t choose to change it, or if we choose to keep it. A radical skepticism 
about foresight would hamper any choice. 
22 This example assumes that the feasible nondemocratic regimes are roughly equivalent in terms of catering for the 
other rights. 
23 Christiano (op.cit., p. 170) also discusses the potential conflict between a HRD and other strong rights, but my 
conclusion differs from his. Since his paper focuses only on the instrumental argument for a HRD, he concludes 
that in the circumstances a HRD is defeated rather than merely outweighed (as it would not serve the purpose that 
determines its value, which is to protect other strong rights). 
24 A possible objection is that since Beitz and Cohen accept that democracy is a demand of justice, they would also 
agree that it gives rise to obligatory goals of reform over the long-term. But if the goals are not also seen as 
responding to human rights (which are a subset of the claims of justice), then their great weight will not be 
recognized: their pursuit will be seen as having a lower level of priority and will be more easily put aside to attend 
to other goals. 
25  See Dahl’s illuminating general framework, which includes a distinction between democratic “principles,” 
“criteria,” and “institutions.” For discussion of specific institutions that are appropriate in different contexts see 
Dahl (1998, chs. 8-11). For a distinction between principles and institutions concerning the HRD see Buchanan 
(2004, pp. 145-7). We can also distinguish between minimal and maximal democratic political equality, seeing only 
the former as the focus of a HRD. Christiano (2011, p. 146) suggests that the former demands institutions securing 
effective and equal voting, equal opportunity to engage in consequential forms of political organization and action, 
and a rule of law supporting independent judicial control over the executive power. 
26 The Universal Declaration’s Articles 19-21 (which can be interpreted as formulating specific democratic rights) 
might be too specific. 
27 Gilabert (2012b, sect. 3.2). This paragraph partly draws on p. 19. 
28 Cohen (2010, p. 365). 
29 One way to motivate this question is to say that our globalizing world involves a “democratic deficit,” as 
decision-makers on issues of great importance (such as environmental protection and trade) are not democratically 
accountable to decision-takers. Beitz (2011) criticizes this approach. 
30 Christiano (2010). 
31 Another possible response would rely on a proportional view of democratic rights. According to this view, some 
may be entitled to more say on a certain issue to be decided upon than others if they have more stakes in it. Global 
democratic arrangements giving different say to different people could then be argued for. On this view, some form 
of global democratic governance would be appropriate because some issues importantly affect everyone in the 
world, although since some would have more stakes in some of those issues than others, rights of political 
participation in decision-making would not be strictly equal with respect to all global issues. On the proportionality 
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view see Brighouse and Fleurbaey  (2010). For a response to Christiano that develops this view see Valentini 
(2014, p. 795). 
32 On the human rights focus for global democratic governance see also Gould (2004, p. 178), and Habermas (2009, 
ch. 7). 
33 For further discussion on human rights and empowerment, see Gilabert: forthcoming. 
34 For another argument that securing human rights and fair global governance provides an appropriate starting 
point for the pursuit global justice see Forst (2012, ch. 12). My argument is compatible with Forst’s, but it is 
different because it does not rely on a constructivist approach to justice. 
35 Cosmopolitanism is the moral view that all individuals are ultimate units of equal moral concern and respect for 
everyone. See Pogge (2008, p. 175). 
36 For example, the pursuit of democratic empowerment occurs in countries moving away from nondemocratic rule, 
as in the recent Arab Spring. It also seeks to deepen democracy in countries that already have democratic 
institutions but face the domestication of the political process by the rich, as illustrated by the recent Occupy 
movement in the United States. Furthermore, and interestingly, the Occupy movement campaigned in solidarity 
with democratic movements in other countries. These movements converge in calling for democratic governance 
both at the domestic and international level. For example, the manifesto “United for # Global Democracy”  said in 
2011 that “Undemocratic international institutions are our global Mubarak, our global Assad, our global Gaddafi. 
These include: the IMF, the WTO, global markets, multinational banks, the G8/G20, the European Central Bank 
and the UN security Council. Like Mubarak and Assad, these institutions must not be allowed to run people’s lives 
without their consent. We are all born equal, rich or poor, woman or man. Every African and Asian is equal to 
every European or American. Our global institutions must reflect this, or be overturned.” See 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/oct/14/manifesto-global-regime-change 
 A further clarification: The cosmopolitan duties (and the humanist ones mentioned in the next paragraph) are 
pro tanto because they can be limited by considerations of feasibility and reasonable costs, and because they have to 
be weighted against agent-relative and associative duties, which can sometimes (perhaps often) be stronger. (Notice 
that agent-relative and associative duties may rely on the generic value of certain special relationships, and be thus 
significant even from the cosmopolitan and humanist point of view.) For explorations of cosmopolitanism and 
humanism in relation to human rights and egalitarian distributive justice see Gilabert (2011, 2013, 2012a). 
37 For helpful comments or conversations I thank Charles Beitz, Luis Cabrera, Rowan Cruft, Maks Del Mar, Carol 
Gould, Stephen Macedo, Dean Machin, and audiences in workshops with the International Studies Association and 
the Princeton University Center for Human Values. 
